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Abstract 
Income has a direct impact on our utility as well as an indirect impact through the goods, 
services and life events it allows us to purchase. The indirect effect of income is not properly 
accounted for in existing research that uses measures of cardinal utility for economic 
analysis. We propose a new approach for appropriately attributing the full effects of income 
on utility and we show the implications of our approach using a longitudinal dataset that 
contains reports of subjective wellbeing (SWB). We show that income has a much greater 
effect on SWB when indirect effects are considered. These results have important 
implications for how we value the marginal benefits of non-market goods and we explore 
some of these issues in the paper. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Economists have a long tradition of seeking to value the impact of goods, services and life events 
on utility. Marginalist theory has now become the cornerstone of much of this activity; indeed, it 
forms the basis of how economists evaluate individual and firm-level behaviour, it is at the core 
of Paretian welfare economics, and it is a general framework for allocating scarce resources 
across the economy. Marginal utility is the basis of marginalist theory. The early work of Jevons, 
Menger and Walras essentially had its roots in the hedonic tradition of Bentham. Over time, and 
with the contributions of Pareto, Slutsky and Hicks, marginalist theory moved away from 
cardinal utility to an ordinal approach that focussed on marginal rates of substitution and revealed 
preferences. 
 
Recent work in economics, however, is reverting back to a cardinal concept of utility, as 
proxied by reports of subjective wellbeing (SWB). The work by economists on this subject goes 
back to Easterlin (1974) but readers are pointed towards more recent reviews of the burgeoning 
literature by Clark et al (2008), Dolan et al (2008) and Stiglitz et al (2009). If we assume, as 
many economists are now doing (see (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2008)), that SWB can be used as 
a proxy for underlying utility, then it is possible to estimate the marginal utility derived from a 
range of goods, services and life events and, further, to derive monetary values for these things 
through the estimation of income compensations (ICs). The IC represents the change in income 
required to hold utility constant given a change in another good. ICs have recently been estimated 
for a variety of market and non-market goods, such as employment (Blanchflower & Oswald, 
2004; Clark & Oswald, 2002), air pollution (Levinson, 2009; Luechinger, 2009) and health 
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell & van Praag, 2002; Groot & van den Brink, 2006).  
 
A major limitation of this work is that the ‘new cardinalists’ have yet to arrive at a 
satisfactory theory of marginal utility. In particular, the current SWB literature has failed to fully 
capture and isolate the true marginal utility of the variables of interest. If the SWB framework is 
to be used in marginal analysis, we must have a robust theoretical framework upon which 
empirical estimates of the impact of different variables on utility can be built. To provide 
monetary values for non-monetary effects on utility (e.g. for use in economic appraisal and cost-
benefit analysis), we must establish a robust ‘exchange rate’ between income and specific goods,   3
services and life events. In this paper, we focus on the key methodological issue of unpicking the 
direct and indirect effects of income on SWB. 
 
The main challenge here is to fully understand the complex and dynamic relationships 
between SWB, income and other variables. Specifically, the studies to date have failed to 
properly account for the indirect effects of income e.g. income will impact upon health status 
which will then impact upon on SWB, thus increasing the relative contribution of income to SWB. 
Therefore, SWB studies have derived biased estimates of the marginal effects of income on SWB, 
which has resulted in biased (and usually exaggerated) monetary values for a range of goods, 
services and life events.    
 
Our Step Approach (SA) recognises both the direct and indirect effects of income on SWB. It 
uses a set of auxiliary regressions that control for the relationships between income and the other 
control variables. The derived coefficient on income then represents both the direct and indirect 
marginal effects on SWB. 
 
Empirical support for the SA comes from analysis of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), which is one of the most widely used panel datasets for research into SWB. Our analysis 
shows that employment, local area safety, caring, and debt burden should have lower ICs than 
those reported in the literature to date and those that would be obtained without using the SA- and 
the differences can be quite large. Employment, for example, is ‘worth’ around £12,000 per 
month (over and above the wage) under the traditional approach, whereas it is valued at around 
£4,000 per month using the SA. The impact of income increases when its direct and indirect 
effects are accounted for, and this reduces the amount of income required to compensate for a 
change in the variable of interest.  
  
The SA has significant implications for welfare economics and for policy appraisal. For 
nearly a century, marginal theory has assessed marginal changes in utility from preferences. We 
build on this tradition to show how marginal changes in utility can be proxied by SWB. Our 
approach also allows us to more accurately establish monetary values for changes in goods, 
services and life events. In so doing, our approach allows us to derive more accurate estimates of 
cardinal utility for policy appraisal and cost-benefit analysis. By appropriately accounting for the 
relationships between the various determinants of SWB and income, the SA ensures that the ICs   4
will be a better approximation of the ‘true’ value of the impact on utility of goods, services and 
life events. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework 
and how, in principle, ICs should be arrived at. Section 3 shows how the literature to date has 
provided biased (and usually inflated) ICs. Section 4 presents the new empirical methodology for 
capturing the direct and indirect effects of income on cardinal utility. Section 5 uses panel data to 
test the SA and shows that all goods or life events have much lower monetary values to those 
implied by the literature to date. Section 6 concludes by providing some recommendations about 
how the SA could be used in welfare analysis.  
    
 
2.  SWB, Cardinal Utility, and Income Compensations 
 
Under the assumption that SWB can serve as an empirical approximation of individual utility, the 
SWB approach essentially uses econometric techniques to estimate the marginal impacts on 
utility of a host of determinants, including income, health status and employment status. 
Monetary values for these determinants can be estimated from the marginal rate of substitution 
between income and a given determinant, controlling for the other determinants of SWB (Clark 
and Oswald, 2002).  
 
The SWB approach has gained prominence in recent years, as more data on SWB and its 
determinants have become available, and as problems with revealed preferences (derived from 
market data) and stated preferences (hypothetical valuation contingent on a market) have 
persisted (Frey & Stutzer, 2002). We do not explore the problems with preference-based 
approaches further here (interested readers are referred to Kahneman & Tversky (2000), Ariely et 
al (2003), Glaeser et al (2005) and Sugden (2005)), but suffice to say that the SWB approach has 
been seen by some economists to be a possible additional, or potentially, alternative way to value 
non-market goods (see (Dolan & Kahneman, 2008; Deaton et al, 2009), in the context of valuing 
health states).  
 
In the SWB framework, the monetary value (IC) of a good (Z) can be expressed as the level 
of income required to hold utility constant in the absence of the good:   5
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where y is income and Z
0 and Z’ are respectively the situations before and after the good is 
endowed, provided or consumed. For a ‘bad’ the IC is negative. Assuming that SWB is a good 
proxy for cardinal utility, we can estimate (1) empirically using a SWB function:  
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where X is a vector of other determinants of SWB, such as age and marital status. (1) therefore 
becomes: 
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    It is relatively straightforward to show that the income compensations required for some 
goods are not constrained by own income; indeed, in some circumstances the IC can technically 
approach infinity. This is because in the wellbeing or life satisfaction approach to valuation, it is 
actual changes in people’s ‘utility’ that we monetise, rather than deriving values from people’s 
statements or revealed behaviours which are naturally constrained by their income budgets. (see 
the Appendix for the formal derivation of this). A large IC is therefore not immediately 
problematic. The problem with existing IC estimates, as stated in Section 1 and as we shall show 
in Section 3, is that they do not correctly estimate the marginal utility of income. When deriving 
estimates of the monetary values of different goods, services and life events, it is essential that we 
account for the indirect effects of income. We can simplify the SWB function in equation (2) as: 
 
) , , ( X Z y f SWB =       (5) 
 
The indirect effects of income need to be explicitly acknowledged, and so (5) becomes:    6
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Here the X variables are to some extent a function of income. In this case, the good, Z, is 
assumed to be exogenous. Set up in this way, (6) captures the direct and indirect effects of 
income on SWB.  
 
We can transform (6) into its empirical counterpart and estimate the IC since, from (4), we know 
that the IC is derived as the ratio of the marginal utilities of the good (Z) and income. In its 
empirical form the SWB function in (6) is as follows:  
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From this the marginal utility of the good is:  
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3.  Problems with existing Income Compensations 
 
The above problems related to the indirect effects of income are of course eradicated if all of the 
explanatory variables are instrumented or randomly assigned in the dataset, but this has never 
been the case in the literature to date. As highlighted in (7) we assume that some explanatory 
variables are endogenously determined (by income) within the model.  
   7
The failure to properly account for the indirect effects of income on SWB is likely to have 
caused the very high IC estimates quoted in the literature to date. For example, Clark and Oswald 
(2002) estimate the IC required for someone to move from employment to unemployment (i.e. 
the value of work) to be approximately £23,000 per month in addition to the loss of the wage. 
Powdthavee (2008) derives very large values for social involvement: using the British Household 
Panel Survey he finds that SWB is associated with greater frequency of interaction with friends, 
relatives, and neighbours, and derives an IC of £85,000 per year for moving from ‘seeing friends 
or relatives less than once a month’ to ‘seeing friends or relatives on most days’. Levinson (2009) 
and Luechinger (2009) both find that the ICs from SWB are orders of magnitude greater than 
(revealed and stated preference) willingness to pay values for environmental goods. Part of the 
reason for any divergence between preference-based methods and the SWB approach will be due 
to the fact that the indirect effects of income are more likely to be captured in preference methods. 
In stated preference surveys, well-informed respondents will state a value of a good based on the 
opportunity cost of the money foregone, ie, the consumption (indirect effects of income) they 
forego to pay for the good being surveyed. In revealed preference approaches house prices, for 
example, will also be determined by the opportunity cost of foregone consumption and so values 
for environmental amenities and other goods based on house price differentials will incorporate 
the indirect value of income to individuals. See the Appendix for a tabulation of all the main 
studies that derive values using SWB. 
 
    The large ICs are generally due to the fact that income has been shown to have a small effect 
on SWB (Carroll et al , 2009; Ferreira & Moro, 2009; Groot & van den Brink, 2006; Helliwell & 
Huang, 2005; Luechinger, 2009; Welsch, 2008b). In SWB regressions, income is usually proxied 
by the level of individual or family income. Income has an instrumental value in that it provides 
people with the ability to purchase goods, services and life events that increase their utility. If we 
control for many of the things that are ‘purchased’ by income, we strip out the instrumental value 
of income. The result is that the coefficient on income will be an underestimate of its true value 
and ICs will be overestimated.   
 
This is essentially the problem of bad control,  where variables of interest cannot have their 
full indirect effects (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Consider the simplified SWB function in (2): 
 
it it it it X y SWB e b b a + + + = 2 1       (2)   8
 
Where, for ease of exposition, SWB is a function of income and one other variable it X . The 
coefficient on income can be described as a function of sample variances and co-variances: 
  
                                                                          (11) 
    
Dividing through by Var(X), we derive: 
 
                                           (12) 
 
where  yX b is the regression coefficient obtained from regressing  it y on  it X in an auxiliary 
regression. If there is no relationship between  it y and  it X , then yX b = 0 and we arrive back at the 
standard unbiased OLS estimator:  
 
            (13) 
   
Our proposition is that income has a causal effect on the other determinants of SWB (e.g. 
health, Ettner (1996)) hence  0 ¹ yX b ;  0 ) , cov( ¹ X SWB ;  0 ) , cov( ¹ X y , which as we can see 
from (12) clearly impacts on the estimate of the income coefficient ( 1 b ) that we derive from OLS. 
In this case, we would like to include these effects in our estimate of the marginal utility of 
income, rather than have them excluded from the income coefficient as per (12) and the SA 
allows us to do this.  
 
  The literature has been remarkably silent on this matter. One exception is Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
and van Praag (2002), who acknowledge that income has indirect effects on SWB and, in 
estimating the IC for different health states using the German Socio-Economic Panel, assume that 
income impacts upon SWB through its effects on a set of domain satisfactions, including leisure, 
housing and job satisfaction. This approach does not, however, provide a full solution for two 
main reasons. First, income is excluded from the final SWB function and thus loses any direct 
value it may have in terms of status effects, erroneously reducing the impact of income on SWB. 
Second, the final SWB function does not include controls for many of the explanatory variables 
that have been shown to impact on SWB, such as age and marital status, thus biasing the model.  
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4.  A New Framework for the Wellbeing Function  
 
Without the option of fully instrumenting all explanatory variables in the model, we therefore 
need a framework that accounts for the direct and indirect effects of income. The SA seeks to do 
this. We have demonstrated that wellbeing can be defined using equation (6). Our approach can 
be used for valuing both exogenously and endogenously determined goods. We focus on the 
latter case here and assume that income is exogenous in the model and define SWB as: 
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This derives the following IC for the estimated good (Z): 
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¶ in the coefficient on income, which makes the calculation of the IC in (15) simpler. This 
will ensure that the income coefficient represents the full direct and indirect instrumental value of 
income. We can then derive more accurate IC estimates for any good. The stages in the SA are 
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The income coefficient should include the instrumental value of income to the individual. In Step 
1 we test for the existence of possible indirect effects by using auxiliary regression techniques 
that are often employed in empirical work to detect multicollinearity. The presence of indirect 
effects is essentially an issue of multicollinearity as the control variables will be correlated with 
income. In auxiliary regressions, the independent variables in a given function are regressed on 
each other to evaluate the relationships and correlations between the control variables. There is 
no strict test for multi-collinearity, but if the auxiliary model fails Klein’s Rule of Thumb (when 
the R
2 in the auxiliary regression is larger than the R
2 in the original main regression (Gujarati, 
2003)) then the regressand can be assumed to be collinear with the other explanatory variables 
and is usually dropped (Griffiths et al, 1993; Gujarati, 2003).  
 
  Rather than drop the correlated variable in question (here income), in Step 2 we adapt the 
procedure to filter out the correlations. Klein’s Rule of Thumb provides a test as to whether the 
specified SWB function is controlling for the potentially important indirect effects of income. In 
Estimate yit = f(Zit, Xit) 




(i) Estimate SWBit = f(yit, Zit, Xit) 
 
(ii) Estimate K SWB   
      regressions, dropping the k
th    
      explanatory variable (Xkit) 
  
(where Xkit = [K x 1] vector of 
explanatory variables) 
 
Estimate SWBit = f(yit, Zit, Xit) 
 
Calculate income compensation value 
MODEL 1   MODEL 2   11
essence, the test tells us whether the magnitudes of  yX b  and  ) , cov( X y are large enough to result 
in the estimate of  1 b  in (12) excluding many of the important indirect effects of income on SWB. 
 
Step 2 
  Here, we regress SWB on income, the estimated good and the explanatory variables – as 
determined in Step 1 – to derive the marginal utilities of these variables. The procedures from 
Step 1 derive two possible estimation techniques for the SWB function depending on the level of 
correlation between income and the explanatory variables.  
 
  MODEL 1 is the model that is used as standard practice in the SWB literature as depicted in 
equation (12). Figure 1 suggests that to use MODEL 1 there should be no correlations between 
income and the explanatory variables, which is a bold assumption to make.  
 
  If the auxiliary regression in Step 1 fails Klein’s Rule of Thumb, we assume that income is 
correlated with the other control variables. MODEL 2 ensures that the full effects of income are 
captured. Here we first estimate a standard SWB function in (i) to derive the direct effects of 
income. Then in (ii) we estimate K+1 SWB regressions (one for each explanatory variable plus 
one for the variable of interest (Z)), where in turn we drop one of the control variables from the 
regressions. Dropping those control variables through which income has an indirect effect on 
SWB will result in an increase in the power of the income coefficient. In effect, this Step adds the 
relationships  yX b ,   ) , cov( X SWB and  ) , cov( X y to the income coefficient  1 b in (12). Variables 
that in theory should not be affected by income (i.e. those variables with  0 ¹ yX b - for example 
age) and those that do not impact on SWB are not included in Step 2.  
 
  Aggregating the changes in the income coefficient for all K+1 specifications of the SWB 
function in (ii) provides an estimate of the total indirect effect of income on SWB. This method is 
preferred to estimating K+1 different regressions for each control variable (ie, a health function 
and a marriage function etc) because (a) it does not force any parametric restrictions on the effect 
of income on the other controls and the subsequent effect on well-being, and (b) it keeps the 
method simple as the full estimation process can be undertaken using only the variables from the 
original SWB function.   
 
Step 3   12
The coefficients (i.e. marginal utilities) derived in the models are used to estimate the value or 
income compensation for any good. In MODEL 1 there is no effect of income on the other 
control variables so we estimate the IC value using the coefficients on income and the good from 
a single SWB function, as is the current practice in the literature. 
 
  In MODEL 2 there is a causal effect of income on the other control variables and we include 
this indirect effect in the coefficient on income. To do this, we add the total indirect effect from 
(ii) to the direct effect from (i). Referring back to the IC calculation in (15), through the SA, we 
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This is the same as the standard IC calculation in (4), but the asterisked income coefficient 
(β1*) incorporates the full direct and indirect effects of income. As stated above, β1* is estimated 
by adding the income coefficient from (i) - which represents the direct effects, to the aggregated 
indirect effects of income from (ii).   
 
  Based on the SWB function in (14) and the IC estimate in (16), we have retained the full 
instrumental value of income. This has been done by re-assigning any impact of the control 
variables that should be accredited to income, thus allowing us to capture more precise estimates 
of the marginal utility of income and the resulting ICs.  
 
 
5.  Empirical Estimation 
 
We test the SA using data from the BHPS. This is a nationally representative sample of British 
households, containing over 10,000 adult individuals, conducted between September and 
December of each year from 1991. Respondents are interviewed in successive waves, and all 
adult members of a household are interviewed. The sample has remained representative of the 
British population since the mid-1990s. We restrict our sample to 16 – 65 year olds and exclude 
full-time students, retirees and those unable to work due to disability.  In the empirical analysis,   13
we use the log of household equalised income. The SWB measure that we use is the life 
satisfaction question that has been well established in the field: “How disatisfied or satisfied are 
you with your life overall?”. Responses are on a scale from 1 (not at all satisfied) to 7 
(completely satisfied). Life satisfaction was added in 1997 and so we analyse the period 1997-
2009, excluding 2000 which did not include health status and 2001 which did not include life 
satisfaction.  
 
  We derive income compensations for: (i) Employment; (ii) Living in a safe area; (iii) Caring 
duties at home and (iv) Burdened with debt. Throughout we calculate ICs based on i) the standard 
method as set out in equations (1) to (4), and ii) the SA. In the model, we compare employed and 
self-employed to unemployed people. ‘Living in a safe area’ indicates whether the respondent 
feels that they live in an area where vandalism and crime are not a problem. ‘Caring duties at 
home’ signifies that the respondent looks after someone living with them who is sick, 
handicapped or elderly. Finally, we classify those ‘Burdened with debt’ as respondents who state 
that debt and interest repayments on loans are a financial burden on their household. Descriptive 
statistics of the variables are set out in Table 1.  
 
  We use equation (2) to estimate a general SWB function. We assume the existence of time-
invariant unobserved determinants ( i l ) of wellbeing: 
 
it i it it it it X Z y SWB e l b b b a + + + + + = 3 2 1     (17) 
 
We include the main explanatory variables that have been found to be important 
determinants of SWB in the literature (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Dolan et al, 2008). 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) show that assuming cardinality as opposed to ordinality for 
the SWB variable makes no difference to estimation results, and that allowing for fixed effects 
does change results substantially. Our preferred model is therefore an OLS regression with fixed 
effects. The results of this model are shown in Table 2. We also present a random effects model 
for information, but focus on the results of the fixed effects model. The coefficient on log of 
household income ( 1 b ) is statistically significant at the 1% level and is estimated to be 0.03 in the 
fixed effects model. 
 
Step 1   14
In Table 3 the following model, which we call the income model is estimated empirically: 
 
yit = f(Zit, Xit)        
 
The overall R
2 of the income model (0.17) is far greater than the overall R
2 of the SWB 
function (0.08). Employing Klein’s Rule of Thumb, this suggests that multi-collinearity with 
respect to income is a notable problem in the SWB function. The income coefficient derived in 
Table 2 is thus not a true measure of the marginal value of income because many of the indirect 
effects of income will be controlled for.  
 
To motivate the discussion below, we first estimate a simple univariate equation; regressing 
SWB only on income for our sample: 
 
it it it y SWB e b a + + = 1     (18) 
 
Since no other control variable is included in the model,  1 b  will include all indirect effects of 
income on SWB. The regression in (18) will of course suffer from omitted variable bias and so 
will not represent the true value of income, but instead it will provide an upper-bound estimate of 
the coefficient on income. Estimating (18) we find that  1 b = 0.09 and that it is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. When we measure the direct and indirect effects of income in Step 2, 
we expect the income coefficient to lie somewhere between 0.03 and 0.09.     
 
Step 2 
The income model fails Klein’s Rule of Thumb, which means that to derive IC values for (i) 
Employment; (ii) Living in a safe area; (iii) Caring duties at home and (v) Burdened with debt, it 
is necessary to use MODEL 2. We have already estimated part (i) of MODEL 2 in Table 2. 
Table 4 sets out the results of part (ii) of MODEL 2. The two age variables and employment 
status are not dropped in the regressions because income cannot affect age and it is unlikely to 
affect employment status. Similarly, education is not dropped because current income is unlikely 
to affect levels of educational attainment 
1. For categorical variables (i.e., health status and 
marital status) we drop all related variables together. Therefore we estimate a total of five 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that we keep education and employment status in the income model (Step 2) because we cannot 
fully rule out an effect of income on these variables.   15
regressions to derive the indirect effects of income. We report the income coefficient for each of 
these five SWB regressions in Table 4. 
 
  We find that income has a positive indirect impact on SWB through marital status and debt 
burden and there are small effects on SWB through living in a safe area and having caring duties. 
The indirect impact via health is negative, suggesting that increased income worsens health. 
Another possible explanation is that our health variable is not a full measure of health status and 
so any positive effects of income on health are already being picked up in the income coefficient.    
 
  The overall impact of dropping each of the variables is an increase in the income coefficient 
by 0.011. This is the aggregate indirect effect of income and is added to the direct effect income 
coefficient of 0.03 from regression (i) in Table 2. On including the indirect effects, the income 
coefficient increases by 40 per cent: we estimate that β1* = 0.041. This result is consistent with 
our prediction that the income coefficient should lie between 0.03 and 0.09. The income 
coefficient of 0.041 is the value that will be used in the IC calculations in Step 3. 
 
Step 3 
We estimate IC values for (i) Employment; (ii) Living in a safe area; (iii) Caring duties at home 
and (iv) Burdened with debt using the Standard SWB approach and the SA. In Table 5, column (1) 
lists the coefficients used in the Standard approach and column (2) derives the IC estimates based 
on those coefficients. Columns (3) and (4) do the same for the SA. In the SA we use the 
coefficient on income from MODEL 2 ( 041 . 0 * 1 = b ). All valuations/ICs are in UK £ per month 
figures. 
 
  The IC estimates derived using the Standard approach (column 2) all tend to be large. Our 
results using the Standard approach resonate the general finding in the literature; that ICs can be 
very high. Using the SA the overall trend is that IC valuations are significantly reduced; on 
average IC values fall by over 50 per cent. A key issue to note here is that although there is a 
general trend in the SWB literature that IC valuations are high, there is considerable variation in 
the coefficient estimates due to the use of different functional forms and datasets. Therefore, we 
do not seek to directly compare our results on variable coefficients to other papers but, rather, to 
show how using the SA changes the IC results for some key variables of interest: employment, 
living in a safe area, caring and debt.    16
 
  First, consider employment. The employed in our sample are made up of full and part-time 
employees and self-employed. The comparison group for the employed is the unemployed. The 
IC estimate derived from the Standard approach is £12,000 p.m, which is considerably lower than 
Clark and Oswald’s (2002) estimate of £23,000 p.m. As income is held constant and leisure time 
forgone is not held constant, the IC for employment is the net value of employment – it is the 
value of being in work over and above the wage income and the loss in leisure time. Using the 
SA we estimate the value of employment to be around £6,000 per month. The sample mean 
salary is around £17,300 per year.   
 
  Second, consider living in a safe area. We find that living in a safe area is valued at around 
£16,000 per year. This is an interesting finding, in that in our model we do not control for house 
prices. Those living in dangerous areas should therefore be benefitting from lower house prices 
and rents which should offset the adverse wellbeing impact of living in an unsafe neighbourhood. 
The value of living in a safe area that we estimate is therefore the value of this amenity over and 
above what is already captured in house prices. This is evidence of imperfections in the housing 
market and a strong argument for not using hedonic market (revealed preference) studies to value 
amenities such as safety – i.e. revealed preferences do not actually include the actual suffering 
caused by living in an unsafe area. Using revealed preference methods, Gibbons and Machin 
(2008) find that a one standard deviation decrease in the incidence of crime has a capitalised 
value of around £20,000 in London at year 2000 prices.  
 
In separate analysis, which we do not show here, we estimated the value of living in a safe 
area for the sub-sample that lives in London and the surrounding Southeast area of England (a 
sample of London on its own was too small to provide statistically significant results) to be about 
£23,000 per annum (this would be in addition to the housing premium derived by Gibbons and 
Machin (2010)). 
 
  Third, consider providing residential care. There is a cost or burden to providing care at 
home for relatives. Under the Standard approach this cost is around £24,000 per month. Using the 
SA, the cost of caring is about £10,000 per month. This is still high because the caring coefficient 
will also include the negative effect of a family member being sick or disabled in addition to the 
task of caring itself. 
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Fourth, consider debt. We find that perceiving to be heavily burdened with debt has a 
negative impact on individual wellbeing. Under the standard approach this impact equates to a 
cost of about £37,000 per month. Using the SA, the cost of debt burden is about £14,000 per 
month.  To put this in to some context, the average amount of debt in the UK (including mortgage 
loans) stands at around £53,000 per household. We have shown that there is a non-financial 
emotional or welfare loss to people who experience high levels of debt. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Measures of subjective wellbeing (SWB) are increasingly being used in economics. A key 
objective of this work is to derive monetary values for goods, services and life events. The 
success of this work will depend on having a robust estimate of the marginal impact of income on 
wellbeing so that marginal rates of substitution between income and the good in question can be 
estimated. The literature thus far has failed to take account of the indirect effects of income on 
wellbeing, thus resulting in implausibly high monetary value estimates for such things as 
employment and environmental amenities.   
 
The SA proposed in this paper develops our ability to use cardinal utility for marginal 
analysis by allowing economists to estimate the full direct and indirect effects of income on SWB. 
In so doing, the approach provides a robust method for calculating the monetary value of any 
good, service or life event for use in cost-benefit analysis. The monetary value is expressed as the 
income compensation required to hold well-being constant for a change in the good in question. 
Income compensations estimated in this way allow us to reconnect economic appraisal with the 
foundations of utility theory – the utility derived from any state of the world. The approach 
developed here can be used by economists and policy-makers as a useful alternative way to 
estimate monetary values that do not rely on revealed or stated preferences. 
 
  Using the SA, we find that the income compensations for a range of non-market goods and 
life events fall substantially to arguably more plausible levels compared to the literature to date 
and the standard estimation approach. For example, the value placed on employment falls from 
around £12,000 per month to £6,000 per month and the cost of the burden of being in debt falls 
from around £37,000 per month to about £14,000 per month when using the SA. We feel that this   18
represents a significant step towards using the SWB approach to valuation in a meaningful way in 
cost-benefit analysis and policy evaluation.   
 
  This is only the beginning, of course, and we need apply the SA to other datasets, with 
different variables and, particularly different measures of well-being (Kahneman and Riis, 2005; 
Dolan and Kahneman, 2008). Nonetheless, the Step Approach represents an important step 
towards valuing utility the marginal and cardinal way.  
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Descriptions  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Life satisfaction  Life satisfaction score, coded on a seven-point scale so 
that 1 = very dissatisfied, 7 = completely satisfied 
5.19  1.19 
Annual household income  Annual equivalised gross household income  £28,121  £20,707 
Employed  Employment status (Employed or Self-employed = 1)  0.78  0.41 
Age  Age of respondent  38.93  12.02 
High education  Educational attainment (Degree (undergraduate or 
Post-graduate) attained = 1) 
0.16  0.37 
Excellent/good health   Respondent assesses own health as 'excellent' or 'good'  0.76  0.43 
Poor health  Respondent assesses own health as 'poor' or ' very 
poor' 
0.06  0.23 
Married  Marital status (Married = 1)  0.56  0.5 
Divorced  Marital status (Divorced = 1)  0.05  0.23 
Widowed  Marital status (Widowed = 1)  0.01  0.1 
Separated  Marital status (Separated = 1)  0.02  0.14 
Never married  Marital status (Never married = 1)  0.2  0.4 
Caring duties at home  Respondent has caring duties at home  0.05  0.22 
Living in safe area  Respondent does not live in an area where they 
perceive vandalism and crime to be a problem 
0.83  0.38 
Burdened with debt  Repayment of debt and associated interest is a 'heavy 
burden' or 'somewhat of a burden' 




Table 2.  SWB regressions 
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction  Fixed effects     Random effects 
   Coefficient  S.E.     Coefficient  S.E. 
Ln (Household income)  0.030***  0.008    0.050***  0.006 
Employed  0.069***  0.012    0.109***  0.011 
Age  -0.045***  0.004    -0.058***  0.003 
Age
2  0.001***  0.000    0.001***  0.000 
High education  0.078*  0.043          -0.030*  0.018 
Excellent/good health vs. fair health  0.263***  0.010    0.360***  0.009 
Poor health vs. fair health  -0.299***  0.017    -0.363***  0.016 
           
Base case: Co-habiting couple            
Married  -0.020  0.017    0.062***  0.014 
Divorced  -0.200***  0.029    -.0287***  0.023 
Widowed  -0.404***  0.063    -0.331***  0.047 
Separated  -0.416***  0.032    -0.463***  0.028 
Never married  -0.179***  0.020    -0.238***  0.015 
Caring duties at home  -0.088***  0.023    -0.122***  0.019 
Living in safe area  0.029***  0.010    0.072***  0.009 
Burdened with debt  -0.101***  0.011    -0.153***  0.010   20
Constant  5.73***  0.109    5.45***  0.083 
N  18,276        18,276    
Overall R
2    0.08       
 
0.12    
Notes:  ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Employed are compared with 
unemployed. Good health and Poor health are derived from the respondent’s assessment of their health of the past 





Table 3.  Step 1: Income Model  
Dependent variable: Ln (Household 
income)    
   Coefficient  S.E. 
Employed  0.338***  0.006 
High education  0.231***  0.022 
Excellent/good health vs. fair health  -0.012**  0.005 
Poor health vs. fair health         0.004  0.009 
     
Base case: Co-habiting couple      
Married        0.0340  0.009 
Divorced  -0.093***  0.014 
Widowed  -0.108***  0.032 
Separated  -0.164***  0.016 
Never married  -0.234***  0.010 
Caring duties at home  0.0254**  0.011 
Living in safe area  0.017***  0.005 
Burdened with debt  -0.033***  0.006 
Constant  9.779***  0.011 
Overall R
2    0.17    




Table 4.  Step 2: Model 2  
Variable dropped  Income coefficient (β1)  Change in income coefficient 
Health  0.0283  -0.0017 
Marital status  0.0414  0.0114 
Caring duties at home  0.0301  0.0001 
Living in safe area  0.0301  0.0001 
Burdened with debt  0.0307  0.0007 
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Table 5.  Comparison of Income Compensation estimates  
   Standard LS approach  Step Approach 











(£ per month) 
Ln Household income  0.030***  N/A  0.041***  N/A 
Employment  0.069***  £12,020  0.069***  £5,800 
Living in a safe area  0.029***  £2,210  0.029***  £1,370 
Caring duties at home  -0.088***  -£24,080  -0.088***  -£10,000 
Burdened with debt  -0.100***  -£36,460  -0.100***  -£14,000 
Notes:  ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. IC estimates are based on an 
average annual income of £16,000.   22
Appendix 
 
A1.  Proof that Income Compensations are not constrained by income 
Assume that there is a non-excludable public good and that its provision is funded 
through taxation (the example and proofs also generalise to excludable private goods 
as commented on below but we focus on non-excludable public goods for ease of 
exposition). Under the theory of the efficient provision of public goods (Samuelson, 
1955), tax becomes a parameter in the individual’s utility-maximisation process: 
 
) , ( max
, Z x u i i z xi
(A1)       
i i i y Z t px t s = + . .           (A2) 
Z u u where ZZ Z " < > 0 ; 0  
 
Here Z = the public good and ti = tax paid by i (essentially the price of the public 























Without any loss of generality, assume that x is a composite good and thus we 





Z u  which is simply the willingness to 
pay (WTP) for an increase in public good provision. Since the public good is non-
excludable, obtaining an efficient allocation of public good provision requires that we 
sum the MRSs across individuals. In a two person economy the efficiency 
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where C is the marginal cost of providing the public good. At the efficient level of 
public good provision (Z*), it is possible that 
i i MRS MRS
- ¹  (this is different to the 
case for private goods, where at the optimum MRSs are equal across all individuals). 
From (A3), it is therefore possible that  i i t t - ¹ . The amount an individual pays in tax 
towards the public good is constrained by her income. 
 
The efficient level of the public good (Z*) can be derived through a Lindahl 
equilibrium so that people pay a tax rate equal to their WTP for the total level of 
public good provision. This tax rate can differ between individuals. The Lindahl 
equilibrium requires that people are honest in their revelations of WTP for the public 
good (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995). Since the amount that individuals can 
pay (in taxation) is constrained by their incomes and a public good is provided up to 
the point when (A5) holds, and since  Z u u ZZ Z " < > 0 ; 0 , an individual can 
make a small contribution to the public good but reap large benefits if others’ WTPs 
are such that a large amount of the public good is provided. This is essentially the 
issue of cross-subsidisation in public goods and it would also be the case for goods 
provided under private insurance schemes in which cross-subsidisation occurs. It is 
possible, therefore, for the individual level IC required for a policy intervention to 
greatly exceed own income. We formalise this in Proposition 1.  
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that  ) , [ ¥ Î o y and that society’s willingness to pay for the 
non-excludable public good (Z) is such that  ) (Z c $ such that ∑ " > Z Z c MRS
i
xZ ) ( and 




Z u u . Then the level of IC is not constrained or upper-bounded. 
 
Proof 1.1. First we show that the level of IC can be greater than own income. Assume 
that  i
i
Z y IC £ . Since  ) , [ ¥ Î o y  and ∑ " > Z Z c MRS
i
xZ ) ( this implies that  ) , 0 [ * ¥ Î Z . 




Z u u  however, then to ensure that  i
i
Z y IC £ * it would imply that  K $ such 
that K Z £ * , where K is some constraint on the level of public goods provided. But we 
know that  ) , 0 [ * ¥ Î Z  and so  ) ( i
i
Z y IC £ Ø  which implies (in this situation) that 
i
i
Z y IC >    ■     
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Proof 1.2. Under some conditions the level of IC can approach infinity. Since 
) , [ ¥ Î o y  and  ) (Z c $ such that ∑ " > Z Z c MRS
i
xZ ) ( this implies that  ) , 0 [ * ¥ Î Z . As 








Z IC Lim i
Z




Table A1.  Summary Table of the main income compensation studies 
 





Various  Unemployment: $60,000 per annum 
Carroll et al. (2009)  Australia   Droughts and 
some other life 
events 
Drought (in Spring time) A$18,000 (deemed very 
large); Marriage A$67,000 p.a.; employment 
A$72,000 p.a. 
Clark and Oswald 
(2002) 
UK   Various  All ICs in per month values. Employment to 
unemployment: -£15,000 (GHQ) and -£23,000 
(SWB); Health excellent to health good: -£10,000 
(GHQ), -£12,000(SWB); Health excellent to health 
fair: -£32,000 (GHQ), -£41,000 (SWB).   
Cohen (2008)  USA   Crime and Health  Crime: $49 p.a. for 10% increase in crime rates. IC 
for burglary is high compared to estimates of cost of 
burglary. Health: Good health to fair health: $161,060 
pa.; Good health to poor health: $276,624 p.a. 
Deaton et al. (2008)  Africa   Value of life  Small IC estimates for the value of life 
Di Tella et al (2003)  USA and 
Europe 
Various  ICs estimated for Macro-level unemployment and 
inflation  
Dolan and Metcalfe 
(2008) 
UK   Urban 
regeneration 
Regeneration: £6,400 (instrumenting for income) - 
£19,000 (not instrumenting for income).  
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
van Praag (2002) 
Germany   Chronic diseases  Examples: IC of 59% of income for diabetes; 43% for 
arthritis; 18% for hearing problems 
Ferriera and Moro 
(2009) 
Ireland   Air quality and 
climate 
Air pollution: €945 per microgram per cubic meter of 
PM10 (5% improvement from average)                                         
Climate: €15,585 for 1c temperature increase in Jan 
and €5,759 for 1c temperature increase in July.   25




Terrorism  IC of 14% - 41% of income to reduce terrorist activity 
to lower levels (as experienced in other parts of the 
country). 
Groot and van den 
Brink (2006) 
UK   Cardiovascular 
disease 
IC for heart disease: Average £49,564 (men) and 
£17,503 (women). £93,532 for 25 year old man and 
£1,808 for 75 year old man. 
Helliwell and Huang 
(2005) 
USA   Non-financial job 
characteristics 
1 point fall in job satisfaction (on a 10 point scale) 
has IC of $30,000 - $55,000 p.a. 
Levinson (2009)  USA   Air quality  $464 p.a. per microgram per cubic of PM10. The IC 
value is larger than for hedonic method.  
Luechinger (2009)  Germany   Air quality  IC of €183-€313 for a 1 microgram per cubic meter 
reduction of SO2. Compared to €6-€34 using a 
revealed preference method. 
Luechinger and Raschky 
(2009) 
Europe   Flooding  Prevention of flood: $6,500; Decrease of annual flood 
probability by its mean $190. This is similar to 
compensation found in Hedonic markets 
Mackerron and 
Mourato (2009) 
UK   Air quality in 
London 
IC for 1% increase in NO2 levels is 5.3% of income. 
Deemed unrealistically high compared to stated and 
revealed preference studies. 
Oswald and 
Powdthavee (2008) 
UK   Death of family 
members 
Loss of mother: £20,000 p.a. (£10,000 with income 
instrumented); Loss of child: £41,000 p.a. (£34,000 
with income instrumented); Loss of partner: £64,000 
p.a. (£36,000 with income instrumented). 
Powdthavee (2008)  UK   Social 
relationships 
IC for seeing friends and relatives less than once a 
month to never £63,000; Marriage: £68,000 p.a.; 
Move from very poor health to excellent health 
£300,000; Unemployed £74,000 p.a. in addition to the 
wage. 





Climate  List of ICs for 67 countries estimated 
Stutzer and Frey(2005)   Germany   Commuting  Commute of 23 mins (sample mean): €242 p.m. 
(18.9% of average monthly wage). 
van den Berg and 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
(2007) 
Holland   Informal care  Caring: €8-€9 Euro per hour if recipient is family 
member. €7-€9 Euro per hour is recipient is not 
family member. 
van Praag and Baarsma 
(2005) 
Holland    Airport noise  IC for noise generated per flight of €253.   26
Welsch (2002)  Cross-
country  
Air pollution  IC of $70 per kiloton of nitrogen dioxide per capita. 
Welsch (2006)  10 European 
countries 
Air pollution  Reduction of total suspended particles $13-$211 p.a. 
per microgram per cubic meter. Comparable to values 
obtained from US property value models.  
Welsch (2007)  International 
- 54 
countries 
Air pollution  IC in range of 'few hundred US dollars' per ton 
nitrogen dioxide for direct effect. The indirect 
pecuniary effect of air pollution on SWB is positive 
as it is an input to production, but it is smaller than 
the direct effect in absolute terms.  





Civil conflict  IC around $108,000 per fatality due to conflict. 
Welsch (2008b)  International  Corruption  1 point index increase in corruption on Transparency 
International 1-10 point scale (which is a relatively 
large change) has an IC of $900 per capita per year 
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